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WALKER - THOMAS STRIKES BACK: COMMENT ON
THE PLEADING AND PROOF OF PRICE UNCONSCIONABILITY
Harvey L. Zuckman*
I. INTRODUCTION
It is startling to find, as late as the year 1970, a judge, whether of a trial
or appellate court, flatly ruling that the concept of unconscionability em-
bodied in Section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code does not en-
compass price terms of sales contracts.1 Such a holding is surprising in light
of the language of section 2-302 which makes no exception for price terms,
the long history of the concept prior to its embodiment in the Code, 2 the
views of most commentators,3 as well as precedent.4 Nevertheless, a judge
of the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions,5 is sustaining objec-
tions to a defendant's interrogatories relative to prices charged by the plain-
*Member of the Bar in California and the District of Columbia.
'The section provides:
(I) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been uncon-
scionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may so limit the
application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause thereof may be uncon-
scionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its com-
mercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making the determination.
Comment 1 to the section provides, inter alia, that the principle of unconscionability "is one of the pre-
vention of oppression and unfair surprise .... "
2See A. Squillante, Just Price, 75 Case & Comment 53 (No. 5 Sept.-Oct., 1970); NOTE, Unconscionable
Contract Provisions: A History of Unenforceability From Roman Law to the UCC, 42 Tul. L. Rev. 193 (1967).
'See, e.g., M. Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 Yale LJ. 757, 787-788 (1969); J. Spanogle,
Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. Pa. L. Rev. 931, 951-52. 964-67 (1969); R. Speidel, Unconscion-
abdity, Assent and Consumer Protection, 31 Pitt L. Rev. 359, 368-374 (1970). But see Note, 67 Mich. L. Rev.
1248, 1251-52 (1969).
'American Home Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver, 105 N.H. 435. 201 A.2d 886, 889, 14 A.L.R. 3d 324,
328-29 (1964); (alternate holding); Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S. 2d 264 (Sup. Ct.,
Special Term Nassau Co. 1969); Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S. 2d 757 (Dist. Ct. Nas-
sau Co. 1966); rev'd as to award of damages, 54 Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S. 2d 964 (Sup. Ct., 1967); State ex rel
Lefkourtz v. ITM, Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S. 2d 303 (Sup. Ct., 1966); Central Budget Corp. v. Sanchez,
53 Misc. 2d 620, 279 N.Y.S. 2d 391 (Civ. Ct., N.Y. Co., 1967); Toker v. Perl, 103 N.J. Super. 500, 247 A. 2d
701 (1968) (alternate holding); Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 279 A. 2d 640 (1971) (class action by NJ. At-
torney General under state's Consumer Fraud Act). Of these cases, only Jones v. Star Credit Corp., supra, held
directly that a price term might be unconscionable under Section 2-302 and did not involve additional factors such
as fraud or illegal contract forms.
In Jones, plaintiffs, who were welfare recipients agreed to purchase a home freezer for $1234.80 from a door-
to-door salesman. The price included time and other miscellaneous charges. After plaintiffs had paid $619.88 to-
ward their purchase they refused to pay any more and sought reformation of the price term of the retail install-
ment sales contract to make it conform to the amount already paid. They claimed that the original price was un-
conscionably high. The uncontroverted proof at the trial established that the freezer unit had a maximum retail
value of approximately 5300. In granting the relief requested by plaintiffs the court said:
"There is no reason to doubt, moreover, that this section (§2-302) is intended to encompass
the price term of an agreement. In addition to the fact that it has already been so applied...,
the statutory language itself makes it clear that not only a clause of the contract, but the contract
in toto, may be found unconscionable as a matter of law. Indeed, no other provision of an agree-
ment more intimately touches upon the question of unconscionability than does the term regarding
price."
'Now the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.
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tiff, ruled last year that "the defense of unconscionability based on price is
not recognized in this jurisdiction." 6
Had this ruling been sustained on appeal, it would have created grave dis-
uniformity in the construction of a critical section of what its drafters had
hoped would truly be a Uniform Commercial Code. 7 Fortunately, in Patter-
son v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., Inc.' the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals, while affirming the final judgment of the trial court in favor of
the plaintiff-seller on what I believe to be a doubtful ground, 9 rejected
in the abstract the idea that price terms were exempted from the coverage
of District of Columbia Uniform Commercial Code Section 28: 2-302. In
this second Walker-Thomas case10 the defendant-buyer purchased from the
plaintiff-seller personal and household merchandise of a total price of
$597.25. The defendant defaulted in her payments after she had paid
$248.40 toward the agreed contract price. In answer to the seller furniture
company's action to recover the unpaid balance, the defendant alleged,
inter alia, that she had paid an amount in excess of the fair value of the
goods and that the goods themselves were so grossly overpriced as to render
the contract terms unconscionable and the contracts unenforceable under
the District of Columbia Code. Because of the lower court's refusal to recog-
nize the defense, all preliminary maneuvers by the defendant to obtain dis-
covery of the plaintiff's internal pricing data and policies failed. A trial
judge subsequently held that the prior rulings on defendant's attempts to
obtain discovery established the law of the case. Since the defendant's then
sole defense was that the goods were grossly overpriced and no proof on this
issue was presented, the court entered judgment for the seller.11
In taking issue with the approach of the trial court, the Court of Appeals
said:
We conclude that in a proper case gross overpricing may be raised in defense
as an element of unconscionability. Under the test outlined in Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture Co. price is necessarily an element to be examined when deter-
mining whether a contract is reasonable.
Necessarily following from this conclusion, according to the court, is the
availability of discovery techniques to obtain relevant information when the
price term of a sales contract is challenged.
This much of the Walker-Thomas (II) decision hopefully will put to rest
the rather metaphysical disputation whether there can ever be an unconscion-
able price term in a situation wherein the parties, without actual fraud or
duress present, have apparently agreed to the term. Had the Court stopped
'Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., Inc. v. Patterson (GS 4872-69 District of Columbia Court of General
Sessions). Record, p. 78.
7UCC Section 1-102 provides:
(1) This Act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies.
(2) Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are
(c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdcitions.
8277 A.2d 111 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971).
'See text and notes infra at pp 308.
" The first one was the celebrated Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., Inc. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir.
1965), which attempted to define what "reasonable choice" meant in the context of the defense of unconscion-
ability.
1277 A 2d at 113.
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at this point and remanded the case for discovery proceedings and a hearing
pursuant to Section 28: 2-302 (2), there would be little if anything in the
Court's opinion to question.
However, the District's high court made two further points which may
seriously limit the availability of the defense of price unconscionability under
the District of Columbia U.C.C.
II. EXORBITANT PRICE TERMS STANDING ALONE
The first troubling point was made in the following rather cryptic words:
We emphasize, however, that price as an unreasonable contract term is only one
of the elements which underpin proof of unconscionability. Specifically, therefore,
in the instant case the reasonableness of the contracts is not to be gauged by an
examination of the price stipulation alone or any other term of the contract without
parallel consideration being given to whether or not appellant exercised a meaning-
ful choice in entering into the contracts.'
2
An uninitiated reader of the court's opinion could not be blamed for puz-
zling over the meaning of the clause "without parallel consideration being
given to whether or not appellant exercised a meaningful choice in entering
into the contracts."
By this language, the court was apparently alluding to the concepts of
"oppression" or "unfair surprise"-the words of Official Comment No. 1 to
Section 2-302. By "oppression" is meant at least the inability to obtain
more favorable terms elsewhere in the relevant market, leaving the prospec-
tive purchaser with the choice only of buying or not buying, 3 and not
even that if the item sought is a necessity. 14 By "unfair surprise" is meant
the thwarting of the reasonable expectations of the buyer relative to the sales
contract because important terms of the contract were not brought to his
attention"5 or, if they were, the terms were not made comprehensible to
him. 6 These concepts (oppression or unfair surprise) have been referred to
"Id. at 114.
"Cf. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A. 2d 69 (1960).
4
Cf. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 450 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (dissenting opinion
of Danaher, J.)
"In Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A. 2d 69 (1960), the New Jersey Supreme
Court, in the course of striking down as against public policy the Automobile Manufacturers Association stan-
dard warranty, disclaimer and limitation of liability clauses in a sales contract for a Plymouth automobile,
noted that these clauses were on the reverse side of the form contract. The only heading was at the top of the
page, following which there was 8 inches of fine print, divided into ten paragraphs and 65 lines, with no attempt
made to label the contents of the ten paragraphs except as "conditions". 32 N.J. at 1.. , 161 A. 2d at 74. Other
critical terms were even more obscured. As the Court observed, "They do not attract attention and there is nothing
about the format which would draw the reader's eye to them. In fact, a studied and concentrated effort would
have to be made to read them. De-emphasis seems the motive rather than emphasis." 32 N.J. at--..._.._, 161
A.2d at 73, See also Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
"in testing for unconscionable contract clauses, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia has suggested as one relevant question: "Did each party to the contract, considering his obvious educa-
tion or lack of it, have a reasonable opportunity to understand the terms of the contract...?" Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965). That case involved an add-on security clause of con-
siderable complexity in a form contract signed by a ghetto dweller of limited education. And in Frostfresh Corp.
v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S. 2d 757 (Dist. Ct., Nassau Co. 1966), rev'd as to the award of damages,
54 Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S. 2d 964 (Sup. Ct. 1967), the trial court emphasized that the form contract under
attack as unconscionable was printed in English while the defendants were literate only in Spanish and that
the contract was neither translated nor explained to the defendants. For a comprehensive analysis of "unfair
surprise" and "oppression" see, R. Nordstrom, Sales 127-131 (1970).
[Vol. 30:308
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as "procedural unconscionability," which may contribute to the ultimate con-
clusion that a term or contract is indeed unconscionable ("substantive un-
conscionability"). 17
The court's apparent reference to the factors of "procedural unconscion-
ability raised an as yet unresolved issue under UCC Section 2-302: whether
a price term may be so exorbitant in relation to what the buyer is receiving
for his money that the contract can be rescinded, the price term reformed
or part of the price paid recovered, without consideration of whether there is
an absence of meaningful choice to the buyer. '
A ruling that "procedural unconscionability" in the making of a contract
must always be present as a cause of an unreasonably harsh term or contract
before the courts may find such term or contract unconscionable serves to
define the fundamental nature of Section 2-302 as "cause oriented" rather
than "result oriented". Thus, if procedural unconscionability is absent in a
given case, then no matter how shocking to the judicial conscience enforce-
ment of a term or whole contract might be, the courts will not be able to rely
on Section 2-302 to avoid the unpalatable result.
It well may be that, upon adequate consideration, the appellate courts
will decide that Section 2-302 is concerned only with the cause of unreason-
ably harsh terms rather than the effect of such terms. Indeed, Official Com-
ment No. 1 to the section states the principle involved to be "one of the pre-
vention of oppression and unfair surprise... and not of disturbance of allo-
cation of risks because of superior bargaining power' 9. Moreover, a
strong policy argument can be made against construing Section 2-302 so as
to give the courts power to strike down unreasonable price terms without
more, i.e., the courts would become price regulators, and whatever is left
of freedom of contract would be further severely circumscribed.
On the other hand, some courts confronted with the defense of uncon-
scionable price terms seem to have operated on the premise that they de-
rived power from the Code to strike down or modify price terms because the
terms were extremely high in relation to the value received by defendants-
17I'he terms "procedural unconscionability" and "substantive unconscionability" were coined by Professor
Arthur A. Leff in his groundbreaking article on Section 2-302 Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's
New Clause, 115 U.Pa.L.Rev, 485 (1967).
'
t This issue has been well considered by the law reviews, if not by the courts, See, e.g., M. Ellinghaus,
In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 Yale L.J. 757, 786-793 (1969) (concluding that what case authority there was
supported the proposition that a sufficient disparity between "value" and price might, by itself be a species of
unconscionability. M. Shanker & M. Abel, Consumer Protection Under Article 2 of the Uniform Cornmerical
Code, 29 Ohio St., L.J. 689, 706-07 (1968) (concluding from the cases that at present price-value disparity alone
is probably not enough to establish unconscionability); J. Spanogle, Jr., Analyzing Unconscionability Problems,
117 U. Pa. L. Rev. 931, 964-967 (1969) (concluding that the cases provide alternative methods of analyzing the
issue).
1
9Yet in the same comment, the drafters also say, "The basic test is whether...the clauses involved are
so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the contract."
This language seems to suggest that procedural unconscionability may not be essential to finding a contract or
term thereof unconscionable.
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buyers. The clearest example is Jones v. Star Credit Corp.,2 0  in which
the plaintiffs, seeking reform of a sales contract, were obligated to make
total payment of $1,234.80 for a home freezer having a maximum retail
value of approximately $300. At the time of suit, the plaintiffs had paid
$619.88 toward the purchase, which was made from a door-to-door sales-
man. The contract was reformed to provide a price term of $619.88. There is
nothing in the decision to suggest that the plaintiffs did not understand the
price term or that they had no opportunity to obtain better terms elsewhere.21
From aught that appears, the plaintiffs, welfare recipients, simply got in-
volved in a very bad deal.
Neither Jones nor any other case to date has faced the bedrock ques-
tion of what is the true nature of the concept of unconscionability embodied
in Section 2-302, i.e., is it solely "cause oriented." The answer to that
question will have considerable meaning to all consumer-buyers, and espe-
cially those in the ghettos who are more likely to be imposed upon in com-
merical transactions than middle class consumers. 2  With such a fundamen-
tal Code issue at stake, resolution by the court in the terse and unconsidered
language previously quoted2 3 can only make a proper uniform construction
of Section 2-302 more difficult to achieve. While my own predilection is for
a construction not necessarily requiring procedural unconscionability, my
concern here is that careful consideration be given to this close and critical
question by our appellate courts, especially now during the formative years of
the Code. Hopefully, since its statement was not necessary to the decision,
the D.C. Court of Appeals will not feel itself bound thereby but will recon-
sider the matter when it is next presented.
2'59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S 2d 264 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Co. 1969). See also American Home Improvement,
Inc. v. Maclver, 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886 (1964). In Mlacluer, the financing application furnnished the de-
fendant buyers was in violation of the New Hampshire disclosure statute (N.H.Rev. Stat. Ann. §399-B: 2 (Supp.
1965)), and the case could have been decided solely on that ground. However, the court ruled in the alternative
that the price term was unconscionable because the goods and services had a value of $959 while the de-
fendants was obligated to make a total payment of $2,568,60. "Inasmuch as the defendants have received little
or nothing of value and under the transaction they entered into they were paying $1,609 (beyond retail value)
for goods and services valued at far less, the contract should not be enforced because of its unconscionable
features." 105 N.H. at 439, 201 A.2d at 889. The case would provide stronger support for the proposition that
great price disparity alone was enough to justify labeling a price term unconscionable if the alternative ground
of statutory violation had not been present.
"The thrust of the decision is found in the following paragraph of the opinion:
"(3) Concededly, deciding the issue is substantially easier than explaining it. No doubt, the mathe-
matical disparity between $300, which presumably includes a reasonable profit margin, and $900,
which is exorbitant on its face, carries the greatest weight. Credit charges alone exceed by more
than $100 the retail value of the freezer. These alone, may be sufficient to sustain the decision.
Yet, a caveat is warranted lest we reduce the import of Section 2-302 solely to a mathematical ratio
formula. It may, at times, be that; yet it may also be much more. The very limited financial re-
sources of the purchaser, known to the sellers at the time of the sale, is entitled to weight in the
balance. Indeed, the value disparity itself leads inevitably to the felt conclusion that knowing advan-
tage was taken of the plaintiffs. In addition, the meaningfulness of choice essential to the making
of a contract, can be negated by a gross inequality of bargaining power. (Williams v. Walker-Thomas
Furniture Co., 121 U.S.App.D.C. 315, 350 F.2d 445)."
"See Federal Trade Commission, Economic Report on Installment Credit and Retail Sales Practices of
District of Columbia Retailers pp. 1-13 (1968).
2"See text at p 310, supra.
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III. PLEADING THE DEFENSE OF UNCONSCIONABILITY
The second difficulty concerns the ruling that discovery was properly
denied the defendant because she had failed to allege the defense of uncon-
scionability with sufficient specificity. According to the court, "Sufficient
facts surrounding the 'commercial setting, purpose and effect' of a contract
at the time it was made should be alleged so that the court may form a judg-
ment as to the existence of a valid claim of unconscionability and the extent
to which discovery of evidence to support that claim should be allowed."
2 4
At the outset it must be noted that Section 2-302 lays down no special
requirements for pleading the affirmative defense of unconscionability. This
is as it should be since it is not the Code's province to interfere with local
rules of civil procedure. 2 Thus, whether the defendant here failed to plead
her defense properly is to be determined by reference to and construction of
Rule 8 of the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions Civil Rules.
26
Rule 8(b) provides in pertinent part that "A party shall state in short
and plain terms his defenses to each claim asserted and shall admit or deny
the averments upon which the adverse party relies." Rule 8(c) states that de-
fenses constituting avoidance or affirmative defenses must be set out affirma-
tively and lists some of the more common affirmative defenses. The rules
are patterned after Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 27 This
rule embodies the theory of notice pleading. That theory requires pleadings
be generalized summaries of the parties' positions2" and rejects the concept
of fact pleading of defenses and claims.
29
The defendant's pleading here appears to satisfy notice pleading theory.
As an affirmative defense she stated:
Defendant denies any debt or liability to plaintiff because the goods and mer-
chandise sold to her were grossly overpriced. Defendant therefore alleges that she
has paid an amount in excess of the fair value of the goods sold. Accordingly, the
balance of the sales contract on which plaintiff bases its complaint is void and un-
enforceable because the terms thereof are unconscionable.
30
This statement is surely sufficient to advise the plaintiff what defense the
defendant is relying on and to show what would be decided by the judgment
for res judicata purposes. 3t That is all that notice pleadings requires in a
case like this,32 and, therefore, unless it can be said that affirmative defenses
are to be treated differently than other pleadings, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals was plainly wrong in affirming the judgment of the trial
court for insufficiency of the defendant's pleading.
2277 A.2d at 114.
25See UCC§ 1-102(2).
26
Now Rule 8 of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia Civil Rules.
2
See Coates v. Ellis, 61 A.2d 28, 31 (D.C. Mun. App. 1948); Taylor v. Yellow Cab Co., 53 A.2d 691, 693
(D.C. Mun. App. 1947).
2
8Wright, Federal Courts (2d ed. 1970) 283.
2
'The major exception to notice pleading in the Federal Rules is the need to "state with particularity" the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. F.R.C.P. 9(b).
"Record, p. 5.
"Wright, Federal Courts (2d ed. 1970) 283.
2A third requirement of notice pleading stated by Professor Wright, ibid, sufficiency to indicate whether
the case should be tried to the court or to a jury, is not involved here since Section 2-302 makes the issues of
unconscionability exclusively one for the judge.
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But it is clear from the few cases considering the point that notice plead-
ing theory does apply to affirmative defenses. In Lehmann Trading Corp. v.
J & H Stowlow, Inc.,33 defendants interposed in a private antitrust action
the affirmative defense of lack of "clean hands" on the part of the plain-
tiffs. 34 Plaintiffs moved to strike the defense, inter alia, on the ground that
the allegations were insufficient to give notice of the defendant's position. In
denying the motion to strike, the court concluded that the pleading require-
ments for an affirmative defense were "no more stringent than those for a
complaint."
That case provides a very clear analogy. The defendants' allegation of
plaintiffs' "unclean hands" were no more detailed than were those of the
defendant in Walker-Thomas (II). Moreover, it is difficult to make any dis-
tinction on the basis of the types of affirmative defenses involved since both
"unclean hands" and "unconscionability" have their roots in the Chancel-
lor's desire to do equity.35
One other case deserves mention. In Moriarty v. Curran,36 an action
for libel, plaintiff moved to strike the defenses and partial defenses of truth,
fair comment, qualified privilege and mitigation because they were not al-
leged specifically enough. In his original ruling the trial judge granted the
motion to strike because (1) facts were not alleged to show that the alleged
libelous statements were true; (2) no attempt was made to differentiate al-
legedly true statements from fair comment statements; (3) no facts establish-
ing any privilege were alleged; and (4) the particular mitigating circum-
stances were not alleged. However, on reconsideration the trial judge re-
versed himself, saying:
As stated in the previous memorandum, the pleadings in a federal court serve
the purpose of mere notice giving. And the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure re-
quire that a pleading shall be simple, concise and direct. Rule 8(b) provides, in
part: "Defenses; Form of Denials. A party shall state in short and plain terms his
defenses to each claim asserted and shall admit or deny the averments upon
which the adverse party relies***." Rule 8(c)(1) further provides that: "Each aver-
ment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No technical forms of
pleading or motions are required." Tested by these standards, the defenses are
adequately pleaded. The Federal Rules provide quite satisfactorily for the eliciting
of detailed facts, and it is an entirely proper practice to leave to these pre-trial
procedures the particularization of notice-giving pleadings.3 7
If fact pleading were to be required for affirmative defenses at all, it would
seem that a strong case could be made for it with regard to the defense of
truth wherein very precise facts are necessary to its establishment. Yet even
"184 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
34 "Third Defense
14. Plaintiffs have participated to such an extent in the activites complained of and have so en-
joyed the benefit thereof, and have themselves so violated the anti-trust laws, as to be disentitled
from maintaining any of the alleged rights of action set forth in the complaint." 184 F. Supp. at 22.
sSee, e.g., J. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (5th ed. 1941) §§397-398; Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz,
172 F. 2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948).
3618 F.R.D. 461 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
1118 F.R.D. at 462. The court rejected a contrary view of pleading affirmative defenses to libel actions ex-
pressed shortly after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure went into effect. See Sweeney v. Buffalo Courier Express,




here the modern view of notice pleading appears to have prevailed. Walker-
Thomas (II) appears to be an a fortiori case, requiring approval of the man-
ner in which the affirmative defense of unconscionability was pleaded.
But even assuming the correctness of the conclusion of insufficient
pleading, the court can be criticized for failing to set forth standards for
pleading this defense. Unconscionability as the court apparently views it in-
volves both negotiational flaws (unfair surprise or economic oppression) and
unreasonably harsh terms. How does one plead facts to show that he was un-
fairly surprised by a contract term? Would it be enough for him to allege, for
instance, that he was outraged when he discovered that all of his purchases
from one store could be repossessed if he defaulted on one payment long
after he thought he had paid for most of the goods?38 Or must he also al-
lege facts as to why he was unaware of such term or its effect? And how
does one allege economic oppression? Must he allege that every other seller
in the relevant market charges the same high price for the goods, 39 or is it
enough to allege subjective factors such as lack of mobility or a bad credit
rating which makes him dependent upon the plaintiff-seller for his goods re-
gardless of the price charged? And must the defendant allege that the goods
purchased were necessities of life?
Similarly difficult pleading questions arise regarding the concept of
unreasonably high price. How does one establish that a price is unreason-
able? Would an allegation that the plaintiff's price was X times as great as
that charged on the average by all dealers in the relevant market suffice?
If so, how many "X times" is enough and how does one define the relevant
market? If an "X times" greater than average price approach is not accept-
able, must the defendant plead facts showing the seller's profit on the trans-
action to be inordinate in absolute terms or in comparison with the average
profit enjoyed by like merchants on comparable sales in the relevant mar-
ket? Even the concept of price itself is not without difficulty. Of what com-
ponents is it made up? Are credit charges part of the price? Are special ser-
vice charges?
40
The court also seems to be calling for evidentiary pleading. Using lan-
guage from Section 2-302(2), providing for an evidentiary hearing by the
trial court when the question of unconscionability is raised, 4 1 the court calls
for the pleading of "sufficient facts surrounding the 'commercial setting,
purpose and effect' of a contract at the time it was made ... "42 But such
mCf. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., Inc. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) ("add-on" clause).
39
CF. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A. 2d 69 (1960) (almost universal automobile
warranty provision).
4°Contributing to the problem of specific pleading here is the fact that no court has ever articulated precise
standards for determining what is and what is not price unconscionability. For an excellent criticism of the vague
way in which the courts have handled the question and for constructive suggestions on how price terms should
be analyzed, see Note, 20 Me. L. Rev. 159 (1968). The incredible complexity of pricing goods in the ghetto is
illustrated by the Federal Trade Commission's recent study of installment sales practices in the District of
Columbia. See FTC, Economic Report on Installment Credit and Retail Sales Practices of District of Columbia
Retailers pp. 32-54 (1968).
1See n. 1, supra, p 308.42277A. 2d at 114.
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facts would be subordinate to and supportive of the ultimate facts of absence
of meaningful choice and unreasonably high price and, hence, evidentiary.
Although evidentiary pleading has been almost universally rejected in Ameri-
can jurisprudence (whether the system of pleading be that of the common
law, the Field Code or the Federal Rules),43 the court's opinion as it now
stands seems to require the pleader to state in his affirmative defense evi-
dentiary matters such as the relative financial positions of plaintiff and de-
fendant at the time they entered into the sales contract; the extent to which
the plaintiff's price varies with and reflects anticipated risks; and the avail-
ability of other credit purchase opportunities to the defendant at the time he
entered into the contracts with plaintiff-seller.
44
Aside from the difficulties of pleading engendered by Walker-Thomas
(II), still another problem is presented. Assuming the ability of the pleader
to divine the type of allegations he must make to get past a motion to strike,
where is he to get the factual information upon which to base the specific
allegations? Without the availability of discovery devices, the plaintiff is -un-
likely to divulge the method by which it came to price the goods involved
and surely will not reveal its profit on the sale. Likewise, other sellers simi-
larly situated in the relevant market are unlikely to provide facts and figures
to help the defendant establish his defense.45 Confronted with such pleading
difficulties, a defendant might be tempted to fabricate the necessary allega-
tions to get past a motion to strike and then seek discovery to aid him in
resisting a motion for summary judgment. 46 This would be a deplorable
result of placing too great a burden on those seeking to rely on the defense
of unconscionability. Another result, equally deplorable, might be the prac-
tical unavailability of the defense in the District of Columbia. Certainly,
most lawyers will not permit themselves to become parties to the fabrication
of the necessary allegations, but, at the same time their clients may be unable
to obtain sufficient pricing information to allow for utilization of the defense.
The court seems to have created a "chicken or egg" dilemma. As I read
its decision, the court is requiring the pleader to allege facts outside his
knowledge before he may have access to the discovery devices needed to
43See A. Reppy & J. Koffler, Common Law Pleading 90 (1969); J. Pomeroy, Remedies and Remedial
Rights §562 (1876); F. James, Civil Procedure 71-72 (1965) Clark, Code Pleading 225-226 (1947); Wright,
Federal Courts (3d ed. 1970) 282-284.
*These and other matters were deemed appropriate for consideration in an evidentiary hearing in an ana-
logous bankruptcy case involving the reasonableness of security agreements. In re Elkins-Dell Mfging Co.,
253 F. Supp. 864, 874 (E.D. Pa. 1966). Whether these matters had to be alleged by the trustee in bankruptcy in
his petition to have the security agreements set aside is not considered.
4
5
Not surprisingly, the 96 retailers providing data for the FTC's survey, supra no. 40, are never identified,
and it may be assumed that they received assurances of confidentiality before parting with important information
on pricing and profit. It is doubtful that the retailers would divulge the same information to a private litigant,
especially when it might eventually become part of the public record.
"See F.R.C.P. 56(f); Superior Court of the District of Columbia Rule 56 (f.
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obtain those same facts.47 Nowhere in its opinion does the court suggest how
the pleader is to overcome this dilemma. Thus, a cryptic opinion of the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals seemingly favoring recognition of the
concept of price unconscionability in the District may instead sound the
death knell for the concept.
4 8
IV. A MORE UTILITARIAN APPROACH TO THE
PLEADING AND PROOF OF UNCONSCIONABILITY
If the doctrine of unconscionability embodied in Section 2-302 of the
Uniform Commercial Code is to be given the utility intended by its drafters,
simplified pleading should be encouraged everywhere 49  and notice plead-
ing of unconscionability recognized in the jurisdictions which profess to fol-
low the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It ought to be enough in Federal
Rules jurisdictions for a party to allege that the goods were sold to him at a
price so much above the price at which similar goods are normally sold as to
be unconscionable and to ask for rescission of the contract, return of that
part of the payment made representing the difference between reasonable
price and an unconscionable one, or simply reformation of the price term to
correspond to the total payment made to date (the relief which, in effect, the
defendant in Walker-Thomas (II) sought). Such pleading puts the seller on
notice of the buyer's defense and the action the buyer wishes the court to
take. This is enough to permit the seller to begin plotting out his rebuttal.
The specific facts of the defense of unconscionability will be revealed in pre-
trial discovery proceedings and the issue will be narrowed in those proceed-
ings or at a pretrial conference. 5°
As with the pleadings, Section 2-302 does not presume to lay down rules
to govern the allocation of the burden of proof on the issue of unconscion-
ability. Such allocation is controlled by local rules of procedure. Rather
generally the party pleading an affirmative defense shoulders the ultimate
4rhe thrust of the court's opinion is:
"Sufficient facts surrounding the commercial setting, purpose and effect of a contract at the time
it was made should be alleged so that the court may form a judgment as to the existence of a valid
claim of unconscionability and the extent to which discovery of evidence to support that claim should
be allowed.
. . .Her defendant's verified complaint alleges only that the goods she purchase and still retains
were grossly overpriced and that she has already paid appellee a sum in excess of their fair value.
There are conclusions without factual support. It cannot be said that the goods were grossly over-
priced merely from an examination of the prices which appear on the face of the contracts. No other
term of the contract is alleged to be unconscionable, nor is an absence of meaningful choice claimed.
We hold that the two elements of which unconscionability is comprised; namely, absence of meaning-
ful choice and contract terms unreasonably favorable to the other party, must be particularized in
some detail before a merchant is required to divulge his pricing policies through interogatories or
through the production of records in court .... 277 A.2d at 114 (emphasis supplied).
"Ihe court's ultimate decision to affirm the trial court's judgment for the plaintiff-seller is also question-
able. The court did recognize in the abstract the possibility of the defense of price unconscionability in the
District of Columbia. Since such defense is legally available and since the issue of how to plead it was one of
first impression in Walker-Thomas (I), the court should, instead, have remanded the case to the trial court
with instructions to permit the defendant to amend his answer to comform to the requirements set down in its
opinion.
"But in Code states it will still be necessary to plead the defense of unconscionability with enough partic-
ularity to avoid having the allegations labelled "conclusory". Note, 48 Ore. L. Rev. 209, 224 (1969).
S
5
Wright, Federal Courts (3rd ed. 1970) 283.
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burden of establishing the defense by a preponderance of the evidence. 51 No
compelling reason comes to mind why the defendant-buyer should be
relieved of the ultimate burden of persuasion on the issue of unconscion-
ability. He is, after all, the party raising and relying on this defense.
The more difficult question is as to what evidence the defendant-buyer
must produce to establish a prima facie defense, thereby placing the burden
of coming forward with rebuttal evidence on the plaintiff-seller. Because of
his access to the tools of discovery such as depositions, interrogatories and
orders to produce documents for inspection, it would not be wholly unfair to
require the defendant-buyer to prove as part of his prima facie case all
elements of his lack of "meaningful choice" (if the courts do indeed decide
that this is a necessary factor in unconscionability) and the unreasonableness
of the price charged by the plaintiff.
However, because of the great complexity of pricing policy, the difficulty
of determining profit on any given item because of the need to allocate a
merchant's fixed costs to each item of sale and the difficulty of establishing
the unavailability of real economic choice to the defendant-buyer in his rele-
vant market (however that may be defined), I favor generally the approach
to the allocation of the burden of coming forward with evidence taken by
Professor Speidel of the University of Virginia Law School.52 He suggests
that the buyer may make out a prima facie case of price unconscionability by
establishing only that the agreed retail price of the goods in issue is at least
twice that of the average retail price for comparable goods sold in the rele-
vant market.53 At this point, the plaintiff-seller, who has by far the better
understanding of his own pricing policies and profit margins is required to
come forward with the facts and figures to justify the price charged the
defendant.
The burden would be on the seller to disclose his actual costs allocated
to the particular sale. These disclosures would permit calculation of the
seller's net profit on the sale in question. Then a comparison of this net profit
with the net profits of similarly situated sellers selling comparable goods
would have to be produced by the seller to allow calculation whether his
price is unconscionable. A substantially higher net profit to the seller on
the sale than that which would be achieved by a comparable merchant would
result in a determination of unconscionable price.
54
SSee F. James, Civil Procedure 255-256 (1965). But as Professor James points out there are exceptions. In
the federal courts, for instance, the defendant must plead contributory negligence as an affirmative defense. But
in diversity cases the federal courts will follow a local rule placing upon the plaintiff the burden of proving
his freedom from contributory negligence. Id. at 256.
1
2R. Speidel, Unconscionability, Assent and Consumer Protection, 31 U. Pitt, L. Rev. 359, 372-375 (1970).
"The arithmetical ratio of 2:1 is tentatively chosen because it was apparently utilized by the Roman and
Civil law in refusing to enforce unreasonable price terms under the doctrine of laesio enormis. See J. Dawson,
Economic Duress and the Fair Exchange in French and German Law, 11 Tul. L. Rev. 345, 364-376 (1937); Note,
42 Tul. L. Rev. 193 (1967). See also A. Squillante, Just Price, 75 Case & Comment 53 (no. 5, Sept.-Oct. 1970).
5
4The high gross retail prices charged by ghetto merchants is likely to reflect not so much inordinate pro-
fits as business inefficiency and low salary draw but high sales commissions to salesmen. See FTC, Economic Re-
port on Installment Credit and Retail Sales Practices of District of Columbia Retailers p. 8 (1968). The difficult
policy question here is whether price unconscionability should encompass price terms inflated by inefficient opera-
tion and high sales commissions. Professor Speidel would apparently decide this question in the negative. See R.
Speidel, op. cit., supra, no. 48 at 373.
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Though agreeing generally with Professor Speidel's basic prima facie
defense approach, I diverge from his stand regarding the content of the case.
First, the 2 to 1 retail price ratio tentatively chosen by him will seldom allow
for the making of a prima facie case. The Federal Trade Commission's
recent Economic Report on Installment Credit and Retail Sales Practices of
District of Columbia Retailers establishes that the retail price charged by the
ghetto or "low-income market retailer" rarely will be double or more than
that charged by "general market retailers" (e.g., metropolitan area-wide de-
partment stores). The FTC found that, assuming a $100 wholesale cost on an
item, the average retail selling price of the item was $159 for the general
market retailers in the District of Columbia and $225 for the low-income
market retailers, or a difference of approximately 62 percent.15
If the prima facie defense approach, based as it is on an arithmetical
formula, is to have much meaning the ratio should be less than 2 to 1. I sub-
mit that a ratio of somewhere between 1.7 and 1.8 to 1 would provide the
defendant-buyer with a real opportunity to make his prima facie case and at
the same time would not shift the burden to the merchant whose price falls
within the average retail price difference between general market retailers
and low-income market retailers.
Because of his position that "the element of assent be excised from the
determination of unconscionability in consumer transactions, ' 5 6 Professor
Speidel's burden of proof analysis concentrates on the price factor exclusive-
ly. But, as a second point of divergence, if the courts decide that procedural
unconscionability is necessary to a determination of price unconscionability,
then it would seem that the defendant-buyer's prima facie defense must also
include some evidence of the absenice of "meaningful choice" or assent be-
fore the burden of coming forward with evidence is shifted to the plaintiff-
seller. It should be enough to establish the prima facie defense for the defen-
dant-buyer himself to testify as to his lack of understanding of the price term
or that, for whatever reason, he could not obtain a better deal elsewhere.
Though I express minor reservations about it, a basic approach other
than Professor Speidel's may make the defense of unconscionable price
practically inaccessible to the consumer because of the complexity of proof as
to the reasonableness or unreasonableness of a given price term. While dis-
covery might be helpful to the defendant in obtaining raw data, proper
interpretation of such data is another matter. Therefore, in the interest of
making Section 2-302 viable, the burden of coming forward with the evi-
dence should be placed primarily on the party in the best position to bear it
-the plaintiff-seller.
V. CONCLUSION
A major purpose of Section 2-302 of the Uniform Commerical Code is
to establish "a boundary of fair dealing" in the commercial world.5 7 The
SSFTC, Economic Report on Installment Credit and Retail Sales Practices of District of Columbia Retailers,
p. 12, fig. i1-1. See also id. at p. 15, fig. 11-2.
56
R.Speidel, op cit., supra n. 48 at 374.
5
7
R. Duesenberg and L. King, Sales & Bulk Transfers Under the Uniform Commercial Code (Student ed.
1966) § 4.08 (2) (b)
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Code did not invent or attempt to define the concept of unconscionability,
but when a trial judge finds unconscionability present in a contract before
him, the Code gives him a straightforward means of avoiding injustice and
forcing elevation of the level of practice in the commercial world.
In this regard, Section 2-302 may be said, in a metaphorical sense, to
embody the very soul of Article 2 and perhaps the entire Code. And, thus,
argument over the construction of the section and its ready availability
involves nothing less than a struggle for the soul of the Code. So funda-
mental a struggle should not be decided in an off-hand manner. Thorough
consideration should be given to the question whether a contract term may
be so harsh to one party as to be unconscionable even in the absence of
unfair surprise or economic oppression.
However this issue is finally resolved, the courts should not place in
the path of litigants procedural obstacles to the utilization of the section.
The effect of making price unconscionability practically unavailable will
be to force the courts to return to the kind of ad hoc scrambling engaged in
by them to avoid unconscionable results prior to the advent of the Code."8
No one will benefit from such a turning back of the clock in the realm of
commercial law.
"tSee Official Comment No. I to Section 2-302; 1 N.Y. Law Rev. Comm. Rep. 177-178 (1954) (Remarks of
Prof. K. Lewellyn), quoted in King, et al, Commercial Transactions Under the Uniform Commercial Code 2-16-17
(1968).
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